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ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
Introduction 
A major influence on what Iowa will be like in the year 2000 is economic 
development. To most people, economic development means a higher level of 
living and a larger economy. More specifically, economic development con-
cerns the growth of business and industry and the number of jobs available, 
and it affects total personal income. 
Iowa has many assets for economic development, including its human 
resources and its wide open spaces. Both of these are in relatively abun-
dant supply. Those assets, however, are not unique to Iowa. 
The state has two basic routes to use in developing its economy. One is 
to encourage development of new local industries. That route has been success-
ful in many of Iowa's communities. Winnebago Industries is probably the most 
notable recent example. 
The other route is to encourage existing firms to locate headquarters, 
new plants or expanded facilities in Iowa. In these days of mass production, 
mass marketing, and the resulting high capital costs, the latter route wi ll 
probably produce the greatest economic development for the state. 
Since our assets for economic development are not unique, Iowa competes 
with other states and even foreign countries for the location of new produc-
tion facilities. Competitive positions are influenced by numerous factors, 
including market demand, technology, cost and supply, transportation, and 
considerations related to living conditions. 
Prospects for Iowa's economy are closely related to the national economy. 
Development of new local industry or success in attracting new production 
facilities of existing firms also will depend on federal policies, energy 
supplies and many other factors. 
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Consequently, many of the decisions or factors influencing economic 
development are beyond the control of Iowans. We can influence, but not 
totally control, economic development within the state. Regarding the 
national economy or federal policies, we can only influence or encourage 
those things that will enhance Iowa's position. 
But even with these limitations, there are many things Iowans can do to 
encourage -or discourage, if that is the choice -industrial and economic 
development within the state. We can influence living conditions within 
our state to make it attractive to others. We can make space and facilities 
available to enhance Iowa's competitive advantage for new industry. 
Recognizing that we can have some influence upon economic development of 
the state, the question becomes in what direction do we make our influence 
felt. Generally, we can strive to increase Iowa's relative share of the U.S. 
economy, or we can work to improve Iowa's relative quality of living. 
More specifically, here are three broad alternatives to be explored in 
some detail: 
I. Continuing Current Social and Economic Forces- doing nothing 
more than is already being done to encourage development. 
II. A Greater Rate of Growth- brought about by a definite policy 
to encourage development in Iowa to provide jobs for more people. 
III. The Good Life- where emphasis is placed on the environment for 
people, rather than economic development. 
To examine the first alternative, current social and economic trends 
and foreseeable changes have been projected to the year 2000. The assump-
tions are that current trends will continue without any major change and 
' ' 
there will be no additional efforts to encourage or discourage economic 
development in Iowa. 
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For the second alternative, a faster rate of growth- still slightly 
below the current national average - has been used to examine what Iowa would 
be like in the year 2000 if economic development were emphasized. 
The third alternative is 11 tricky 11 • First, we must define exactly what 
is meant by the .. good life 11 • Most of us have vague thoughts about the good 
life, probably relating to open space, greenery, recreation facilities and 
quality services. But for a development plan, we•11 have to be more 
specific. 
If our definition of the good life is to include open space, recreation 
facilities and quality services, how are these to be paid for? If the good 
life is to include a certain level of income, there are relationships to 
business and industry that we must recognize. 
Obviously, it is impossible to predict the future. Uncertainty concern-
ing the year 2000 is great. Current trends can be changed greatly by energy 
limitations, which are a possibility; by energy costs, which are likely to 
rise; by natural resource availability and costs; national policy regarding 
pollution or population distribution; or by changes in human values regard-
ing work, savings, family, honesty, property and many more things. With 
these handicaps, here is a look at how Iowa may appear in the year 2000 
under the three alternatives. 
'\ 
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ALTERNATIVE I -CONTINUING CURRENT SOCIAL 
AND ECONOMIC FORCES 
If social and economic conditions of the past continue, Iowa will 
experience only slight population growth by the year 2000. This is assumi ng 
that future growth will be much like the past, both in quantity and type; 
that energy limitations do not make drastic changes in the nation; that 
birth rates do not vary greatly from the past; and that gains in productiv-
ity per worker increase at the same rate. Under these assumptions, Iowa 
would have a population of just over 3,100,000 in the year 2000- a growth 
rate of less than 10 percent over the 27 years. 
But state totals can hide some dramatic economic and population changes 
that likely will take place in Iowa in the future. Because eastern Iowa is 
under the influence of the Chicago trade area and with the tendency of indus-
trial facilities to locate in areas already industrialized, much of Ipwa•s 
future growth will take place in the east-central part of the state. 
Thus, the counties surrounding Davenport, Waterloo, Cedar Rapids, 
Des Moines and Dubuque would have a 34 percent average growth in popu l ation 
by the year 2000. The Davenport area would experience the greatest growth, 
about 52 percent, with the Waterloo area second with about 36 percent, the 
Cedar Rapids and Des Moines areas at 30 percent, and the Dubuque area at 
about 26 percent. The remainder of the state probably would decline in popu-
lation, with the exception of the Burlington area, which may experience a 
small increase. (See Map 1.) 
In addition, Iowa•s population will become increasingly urbanized, with 
the percentage of rural inhabitants- those living in unincorporated places-
falling from 31 percent of the population in 1970 to less than 15 percent 
in 2000. 
Map 1. 1970 population and projected population in year 2000, with percent change by planning areas of 
Iowa under Alternative I -continuing current social and economic forces. 
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Economically, the future looks bright for Iowa. Historically, the state 
has lagged just below the national average in per capita income. Yet, real 
output per worker in Iowa has been increasing at a higher rate than the 
national average. Real output per worker is the dol l ar value of goods or 
services produced per person. 
' The higher rate of real output probably is due to Iowa•s agricultural 
sector with its higher rate of growth in productivity. In the recent past, 
that high rate of productivity tended to hold prices steady at farm program 
targets. Farm incomes have risen with the increased productivity, even 
though prices did not increase much in the last decade. However, should food 
demand continue to use this productivity as it has in the past year, Iowa•s 
economic future would be improved considerably. 
Also contributing to increased total and per capita personal income in 
Iowa is the growth in the labor force participation rate. In the United 
States generally, and in Iowa specifically, the number of people between the 
ages of 24 and 64 holding jobs is increasing. Most of the increase is due 
to the number of women entering the labor force. That increase is expected 
to continue, particularly in rural areas of the state, where it has been 
growing but remains relatively low at this time. 
The increased participation in the labor market, plus the higher rate 
of productivity in the state, suggest that per capita personal income will 
increase about 1.65 percent annually. On this basis, average per capita 
income should increase about 66 percent from 1970 to 2000. Average per 
capita income in Iowa in 1970 was $3,586 and should rise to $5,947 in the 
year 2000, measured in constant 1970 dollars. 
Again, however, state averag.es hide differences between areas. Most of 
the rural areas, for example, will experience a greater percentage growth in 
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per capita income than the metropolitan areas. Most of this growth will 
come from the increase in labor force participation -more women working. 
The urban areas have already experienced rapid rises in the number of women 
workers, and this restricts growth potential. 
Consequently, the projections indicate an 82 percent per capita growth 
in income for the Creston area from 1970 to 2000, with an 81 percent increase 
in the Council Bluffs area, and an 80 percent increase in the Mason City and 
Marshalltown areas. The least increase, according to the projections, would 
be in the Des Moines area with an increase of 57 percent. (See Map 2.) 
Implications 
Under this alternative, Iowa will continue to experience the same gen-
eral benefits and consequences of growth that have occurred in the past. 
The number of workers engaged directly in agriculture will continue to 
decline. Industrial, service and government jobs will increase, but not at 
a rate adequate to provide jobs for all the natural population growth. The 
net result will be continuing out-migration of people from the state. 
Though the population will grow, significant numbers of people will leave 
the state for other employment opportunities and the state•s population will 
not be as large as it would have been without this migration. Out-migration 
will affect southern and western areas of the state to a greater degree. 
The number of jobs for men in these areas will decline, although there will 
be more opportunities for female employment. 
Generally, those who migrate are the younger working people. Thus, 
areas with heavy out-migration will tend to have a larger percentage of their 
population in the older age groups. This will tend to increase demand for 
certain types of services, such as transportation and health care. 
Map 2. 1970 per capita income and projected per capita income in year 2000, with percent change by planning 
areas of Iowa under Alternative I -continuing current social and economic forces. (Expressed in 
constant 1970 dollars.) 
$2,965 
4,885 
3 
+65% SPENCER 
$3,478 
6,064 
4 
. SIOUX CITY 
$3,403 
6,130 
2 
MASON CITY 
+80% 
$3,231 
6,206 
5 
FORT DODGE 
+92% 3,690 6,647 
$3,017 
4,760 
1 
DECORAH 
$3,555 +58% 
6,050 
7 
WATERLOO 
+70% I DUBUQUE 
..---.---... ----u3,248 
6 
$3,776 
5 '781 
5,269 
+62% $3,218 
5,265 12 
CARROl 
$3,990 
6,270 MARSHAll TOWN 10 $3,931 6,4~5 
$3,443 
6,225 +64% 
1 1 
DES MOINES 
13 
.COUNCil BlUFFS +57% 
Top figure: 
Middle figure: 
Bottom figure: 
+81% 
$3,045 
5,551 14 
CRESTON 
+82% 
1970 per capita income 
Projected per capita income in 2000 
Percent change 1970-2000 
I CEDAR RAPIDS 
+80% 
$3 '179 
5,453 
15 
OTTUMWA 
+72% 
+53% 
State: $3,586 
5,947 
+66% 
i DAVENPORT 
..--.... +65% 
16 
BU RLI NGTON 
$3,643 
6,270 
+71 % 
9 
Small school districts and small governmental units will be subject to 
increasing stress in the future, particularly those in the west and south 
where population declines. These units of government will be under pressure 
to provide additional services, with a decreasing number of taxpayers to 
finance them. Consequently, there will be increasing pressure to reorgan i ze 
to achieve lower per capita costs and quality services. 
School enrollments are falling rapidly because of declining birth rates 
and farm consolidation in some areas. The pressure for reorganization will 
be greatest on those districts with fewer than 500 students in kindergarten 
through twelfth grade. A straight-line projection to the year 2000 based on 
the last decade indicates that one reorganization a year would occur, reduc-
ing the number of school districts in the state from 452 to 425. However, 
if the rate of school reorganization does not change faster than this, many 
of the 131 schools that now have fewer than 500 pupils will be very small 
and hard pressed to provide even a minimally acceptable school program. 
Such reorganization of schools and governmental units undoubtedly will 
be resisted as they have in the past because of town pride and the desire 
for local control. The alternatives to reorganization are either higher 
costs or a decline in the number and quality of services. 
Generally, retailing and service institutions in small towns (those 
under 1,500 persons) will continue to be squeezed . . These small-town busi-
nessmen face the problems of a declining number of customers who will have 
the ability to travel quickly and easily to larger retail centers with a 
greater selection of goods. Businessmen will also have increasing income 
requirements both for themselves and their labor. Only farm supply and 
service businesses in small communities have experienced growing business 
volumes in recent years. 
, 
10 
Consequently, the quantity and quality of services are likely to 
increase mainly in towns with a population of 5,000 or more today. Both 
public and private services will be affected by these trends. So rural and 
small-town peop1e may be forced to drive farther to obtain services in the 
coming decades. 
Transportation services may decline also, again most likely in the 
western and southern parts of the state. This decline could include abandon-
ment -or at least reduced maintenance -of unpaved county roads and continu-
ation or possibly acceleration of abandonment of low-volume, uneconomical 
railroad lines. 
On the whole, Iowa will experience substantial growth in property values 
over this period. The main exception will be business establishments in 
small towns with declining population. 
Taxes are expected to increase, both in total amounts and in per capita 
terms. In the past, as incomes have gone up, people have demanded more 
services- including public services. In addition, increasing population 
and population density also tend to require more public services in the grow-
ing areas. 
But the per capita tax burden could increase as much or more in the 
declining areas of the state, where the fixed costs of local government and 
small school districts will be spread over fewer and fewer people. 
With these trends, projecting taxes for the future is almost impossible. 
However, an estimate of the tax burden in the year 2000 can be projected by 
making assumptions. For instance, if combined state and local taxes continue 
at their 1970 level of about 11 percent of personal income, the total would 
rise from about $390 per person in 1970 to $665 per person in 2000, based on 
expected increases in personal income. Assuming that state and local taxes 
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combined would increase to at least 13 percent of personal income, the figure 
for the year 2000 would be $773 per capita. 
These increased tax funds are most likely to be spent for additional 
sewer and water facilities in growing areas, for continuing education, recrea-
tion, health services, public housing, roads and crime control. 
If the present timetable on environmental regulation is adhered to, Iowa 
can develop in the manner projected with little damage to its environment. 
In fact, environmental conditions may even improve. 
Five years ago there was considerable open burning in Iowa. By 1975 all 
such burning will be banned. Sanitary land fills will handle most of the 
discarded material. But there will be fewer discards as recycling of waste 
expands, not only to curb pollution, but also to conserve scarce natural 
resources. And taxpayers may even receive a bonus as rising prices on raw 
materials create markets for waste materials that taxpayers once buried. 
National policy calls for a halt to discharge of any pollutant into 
navigable waters by 1985. By then all industry must either be serviced by 
an adequate municipal waste disposal system, or provide its own system if a 
municipal system is unavailable or is unable to handle the industrial wastes. 
Pollution policies regarding agriculture are not as clearly spelled out. 
But it is almost a certainty that substantial pressure will be placed on 
agriculture to halt pollution by agricultural chemicals, animal waste, or 
silt, the major cause of water pollution in Iowa. 
Obviously, there are costs for these environmental benefits. But Iowa's 
farm income should not be affected adversely in relation to other areas. In 
fact, a national policy on agricultura·l pollution may strengthen the state's 
comparative advantage, with its large amounts of relatively level farmland. 
Pollution regulations would place more limitations on hilly marginal cropland 
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of other states. 
Iowa•s relatively sparse population also is an advantage in air pollu-
tion where the automobile and space heating are major contributors to the 
problem. These are not likely to be serious problems in Iowa in the fore-
seeable future. 
Recreation may become a more important factor in the state. Increasing 
population, leisure time and rising incomes will create demand for more 
recreation within the state. Such demand could create competition for land 
with agriculture. 
Finally, related to nearly all the factors discussed so far is the 
matter of political power. With the one-man, one-vote concept that has 
reapportioned legislatures throughout the nation, Iowa•s political power 
wi ll continue to shift in the future from rural to city as urbanization 
increases. And as this population becomes more heavily concentrated in the 
east-central portion of the state, that region can be expected to gain 
political strength. 
In summary, Iowans can look forward to a considerable rise i n per capita 
incomes between now and the year 2000. Along with this may come some move-
ment toward a shorter work week and perhaps earlier retirement. In the past, 
Americans have tended to 11 trade 11 some of their increased income for more 
leisure time or a longer retirement. 
Iowa can expect a moderate growth in manufacturing employment, relatively 
slow growth in construction and transportation employment, and a decline in 
agricultural employment. Service sectors of the economy- both public and 
private -are expected to grow as a more affluent public seeks a better qual-
ity of life. 
This greater affluence also is likely to be reflected in an increasing 
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demand for energy. As people become more affluent, they attempt to buy time, 
convenience and comfort through such products as dishwashers and air condi-
tioners. In addition, higher incomes will create more demand for travel and 
recreation, affecting the demand for oil and gasoline. 
The implications of these demands for energy will be discussed more 
fully in a separate section of this series. However, barring technological 
breakthroughs in the area of energy, it appears the nation will become 
increasingly dependent on foreign imports for fuel supplies. To maintain a 
balance of payments, we will need to increase exports. Currently, farm 
products are providing much of the increase in exports. Continuation of 
that trend will be favorable to farm prices, farm income, and Iowa. 
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ALTERNATIVE II -GREATER GROWTH 
As suggested in the introduction, one of Iowa's alternatives is to pro-
mote greater economic development by encouraging the creation and location 
of jobs in Iowa. Such an alternative has many attractive features. It 
wou ld provide jobs for more young people, stemming the migration of people 
out of the state. It would increase total income, produce more retail busi-
ness and create a bigger economy. There would, of course, be costs - compe-
titian for land, less open space, increased needs for schools and other 
public services, higher taxes, an increase in population density, more change 
in the rural life style, and possibly more pollution and crime. 
The most feasible method of accomplishing this goal is to encourage out-
side firms and existing industry to expand the "export" sector of the economy. 
"Export" industries produce products that are sold outside the state with the 
money coming back to the state for salaries, services and raw materials. 
When the export sector grows, other sectors of the economy follow along to 
provide food, services and goods to export production workers. 
Since Iowa would compete with other states to obtain these export indus-
tries, phenomenal growth is not likely. Consequently, to illustrate what 
I 
Iowa might be like in the year 2000, we have selected a realistic goal -an 
increase in manufacturing employment just 5 percent per decade larger than 
the "normal" growth projected under Alternative I. 
That increase appears small and still is below the projected increases 
in growth for the nation over this period. Yet such growth would produce 
impressive increases in employment and population when compared with Iowa's 
past. That rate of growth would have a dramatic effect on reducing the out-
migration Iowa has experienced since World War II. Since those leaving the 
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state tended to be younger, economic growth that would retain these peopl e 
would increase the percentage of young people in the state by the year 2000. 
If such a moderate increase in growth could be accomplished, Iowa in 
2000 would have nearly 3-1/2 million people- a gain of 23 percent over the 
30-year period. Per capita income would rise at a faster rate than under 
Alternative I- 1.75 percent a year, instead of 1.65- for a total gain of 
69 percent by 2000, compared to 1970. (See Maps 3 and 4.) 
That increase in per capita income may be a bit optimistic, however. 
For in attempting to obtain as many jobs as possible, some lower wage indus-
tries might have to be accepted. While that may increase total income by 
employing more people, it may not produce as high a per capita income. Low-
wage industries also would not encourage all young people to remain in the 
st ate. They might still choose to move out of state for better paying jobs. 
And unless the development policy includes restrictions on the location 
of growth, most of the new growth again would occur in the east-central por-
tion of the state. A location policy would be difficult to enforce, however. 
The state could decide it would allow only so much growth in the ,east-central 
part of the state and then request, or make space available for, development 
in other areas. But a manufacturer who is told he cannot build in Davenport 
may go to Illinois, instead of Creston or Spencer. 
Therefore, we have assumed that under this plan for greater growth 
there would be no restriction on location. In this case, the counties around 
Waterloo, Dubuque, Davenport, Cedar Rapids and Des Moines would have the 
greatest population growth- an average of 44 percent. By 2000 this would 
put about 2,160,000 people in those areas- 62 percent of the state total. 
The greater rate of growth also would not reverse the expected decline 
in population in the southern and western parts of the state. The counties 
Map 3. 1970 population and projected population in year 2000, with percent change by planning areas of 
Iowa under Alternative II -greater growth rate. 
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Map 4. 1970 per capita income and projected per capita income in year 2000, with percent change by planning 
areas of Iowa under Alternative II- greater growth rate. (Expressed in constant 1970 dollars.) 
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around Marshalltown, Burlington, and possibly Sioux City would have a slight 
population increase, however. 
Though the projections assume a uniform percent increase in growth for 
all areas of the state, manufacturing employment in southern and western Iowa 
is generally such a small part of the total that the increase in growth would 
not reverse the basic population trends. 
Likewise, political trends would follow the general pattern established 
under Alternative I. Under the greater growth rate, the east-central portion 
of the state, having 62 percent of the population, obviously would have more 
political power. 
Implications 
Generally, most of the benefits and consequences of growth indicated 
under Alternative I would just increase slightly under Alternative II. 
Unfortunately, the drawbacks of growth would be accelerated, also. 
There still would be pressures on local governments and schools in the 
western and southern parts of the state. Small towns in the east-central 
region, of course, would benefit some from the growth of this region, par-
ticu l arly as residential or 11 bedroom 11 communities. But that growth will not 
cure all the problems of the small-town merchants even in these areas. 
Towns that now have a population of 5,000 or more would experience more 
growth, regardless of location. The quality and range of retailing and other 
services should improve in these communities. And some of them could develop 
into thriving mid-size {5,000 to 25,000) communities as the export sector of 
their economy grows. Towns of 2,500 to 5,000 should remain at least stable 
in population. 
Transportation needs would change in only a minor way from Alternative I. 
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The pressure to abandon some lightly used roads in the south and west would 
continue. Low-volume branch rail lines would still be under pressure for 
abandonment, except possibly some of those in the east-central region. 
Nationally, considerable development can be expected in mass transit 
systems. But Iowa, even under this greater rate of growth, would have no 
cities large enough to justify investment in mass transit. Some upgrading 
and expansion of bus lines would be likely, however. As this implies, Iowa 
will not have any cities counting population by millions even by the year 
2000. · Even Des Moines and Cedar Rapids are not expected to have population 
l arge enough to justify subways or monorails. 
The greater growth under this projection, of course, would mean higher 
property values and a growing tax base. Again, the exception would be busi-
ness properties in the small towns of southern and western Iowa. 
But as property values and tax base grow, so do demands. The total tax 
collection and per capita taxes would increase. Per capita taxes wou~d 
increase in sparsely populated areas because the fixed costs of government 
and schools would be spread over fewer people; in the developing areas of 
the state, taxes would increase because of the need for additional services, 
such as schools, sewers, water and streets. Consequently, the tax projec-
tions under Alternative I would be even higher under the high-growth economy. 
Again, if present pollution regulations follow planned timetables, Iowa 
can accomplish this greater rate of growth with little effect upon the 
environment. Most of the pollution increase would be visual or aesthetic. 
With greater industrialization, markets for solid waste materials, such as 
scrap metal or paper, may develop more rapidly. 
The greater growth and urbanization would increase the pressures for 
recreation space. Pressure would come from the additional 400,000 people -
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most of them in one section of the state- the higher per capita incomes, and 
growing numbers of people in surrounding states. 
Implementation 
Such a higher rate of growth in the economy will not come naturally to 
Iowa. Possible changes in national policy could bring about such growth, 
however. 
First, if the nation were to adopt a policy to encourage development in 
the more sparsely populated areas in the nation, Iowa's chances of a greater 
growth rate would be enhanced. Such a policy has been discussed to create a 
better balance between the declining rural areas and the growing metropolitan 
areas. 
Another policy change could boost Iowa's growth potential. Should 
present pollution standards prove to be too restrictive and costly to the 
nation, one solution could be to relax requirements in areas with low con-
centrations of pollution. Should such a situation develop and should it be 
resolved in this manner, Iowa could have an influx of industry. 
Without such policy changes, which are only rare possibilities, only a 
concerted effort on the part of individuals, local communities, and the 
state as a whole can bring about the changes needed to produce a higher rate 
of growth in Iowa. 
To attain greater growth, Iowans should encourage higher growth rates in 
the nation. This can be done by keeping the dollar's value in line with 
other currencies to maintain a competitive advantage for U.S. goods in over-
seas markets. National pride and patriotism may encourage keeping the dollar 
stable, but keeping the dollar artificially overvalued decreases our ability 
to export goods. 
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National economic growth also can be encouraged by having the federal 
government maintain full employment and budgeting money for research and 
development. Research and development can produce technological break-
throughs that will boost economic growth. A particularly important area is 
energy. Development of a plentiful and cheap source of energy would greatly 
increase national economic growth. 
As indicated earlier, Iowans might encourage the nation to adopt a 
policy of industrial decentralization and population redistribution. Such 
policies could call for higher taxes on new plants in already crowded areas. 
Or they could provide subsidies to industries willing to invest in sparsely 
populated areas like Iowa. 
At the state level, Iowa could work to guarantee employers a highly pro-
ductive 1abor force. Such activities might include making surveys of avail-
able labor, providing vocational and technical training to meet the needs of 
industry, stressing adult education to retrain workers or to provide them 
with new and improved skills, and preventing special interest groups from 
restricting productivity in any manner. 
To attract industry, the state should not make any pollution or environ-
mental standards more stringent than federal codes. In fact, the state 
might ask for exceptions to federal standards because of its relatively 
sparse population. This could provide Iowa with a strong competitive advan-
tage in attracting a larger share of the U.S. economy. 
Another inducement to industry would be to shift the burden of state 
and local taxes away from export industries. This would require, however, 
that the burden be shifted onto personal income, retail sales, agriculture 
and local merchants. 
Iowa also might adopt the 11 Southern strategy .. for obtaining economic 
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growth and development. This might include issuing public industrial bonds 
for land and buildings to provide industrial parks; providing free utility 
connections, rail spurs and highway access roads. Local governmental units 
also could grant property tax exemptions for certain periods of time. 
Finally, the state might cooperate with the federal government to deve l op 
the Missouri River to improve barge transportation. Such development might 
also include recreation facilities on the river and its tributaries and a 
state plan to develop interior waterways along the Missouri. Such a program 
would help reverse the decline of western Iowa. 
In summary, a higher rate of growth is possible for Iowa, but it is not 
as likely to occur without changes in federal policies, or a giant effort by 
the state to recruit new industry. Benefits of such growth appear attrac-
tive, but there are also many costs. If concessions are made to new industry, 
other segments of the economy must bear the costs, and in addition, there 
will be sizable public costs in providing public services to the growing 
number of people as the state industrializes. 
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ALTERNATIVE III -THE GOOD LIFE 
A third alternative for Iowans is to emphasize the good life. In this 
alternative, emphqsis would be placed in state and local regulation and 
development policy on the quality of living, rather than the quanti ty of 
total economic activity and employment. 
But to examine the good life and its implications, we'll have to decide 
exactly what we mean by the term. A definition of the good life is offered 
here. Not everyone may agree with the definition, but it provides a target 
for discussion. And it provides a framework for examining the implications 
of such a policy and the reality of being able to accomplish the goal of the 
good life. The definition is based on one of the more widely acdepted con-
cepts of human needs and motivation. 
Basically, the good life should provide the opportunity for each indi-
vidual to realize his full potential. Realizing one's ful1 potential means 
the opportunity to fulfill one's needs for: 
1. Survival- food, clothing and shelter. 
2. Security- safety, economic wel1-being, certainty, social order. 
3. Belongingness -love, trust, primary relationships. 
4. Self-esteem- the need for recognition and dignity. 
5. Self-actualization- satisfaction, growth, fulfillment, and 
new experiences. 
Specifically, fulfillment of these needs suggests that all persons be: 
- Well-fed- receiving the recommended dietary requirements with a 
choice of a variety of foodstuffs and methods of preparation. 
- Comfortably clothed- physically comfortable in addition to being 
able to select from varying styles and quality. 
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Decently housed -having shelter that is safe, within economic 
reach, and allowing expression of style of life. 
Under security, the person living the good life should be: 
Free from worry and danger regarding crime or dread diseases. 
- Assured of job opportunities that provide income for needed 
goods and services, and discretionary income for individual 
wants and investment for an adequate retirement income. 
- Have access to needed services and assistance when affected by 
unavoidable disasters such as floods or disease. 
Under belongingness, the person with the good life should have: 
- A living situation in a family or family substitute that develops 
mutual trust, love, closeness, and skills in developing healthy 
relationships with others. 
- Trained personnel available to assist in finding ways to fulfill 
this need when conventional ways break down. 
- Access to an array of groups and organizations so he or she can 
select opportunities for developing and achieving belongingness. 
For self-esteem, the need for recognition and reward to enhance one•s 
feeling of self-worth, the good life would require: 
- A variety of groups and organizations to choose where one 
could achieve recognition. 
A wage and work system providing both dignity and opportunity 
for individual recognition. 
Human development procedures in education, industry and organiza-
tions that foster positive self-images, rather than negative ones. 
The good life cannot occur unless there is opportunity for self-actuali-
zation. This would require: 
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- That each person have the means to pursue new learning and have 
new experiences throughout his learning, working and retirement 
life, with a wide variety of choices. 
In the past, many efforts to achieve the good life have tended to pro-
vide it only for those who 11 deserve .. it by some definition. The good life 
as defined here would provide the opportunity for the good life to all per-
sons, even though some may choose to ignore the opportunity or take little 
advantage of it. 
Many people today have achieved the goals of survival and security. A 
major concern, of course, is those who have not achieved these levels of the 
good life. The disadvantaged would require special help to attain these 
levels. 
But as the definition indicates, the good life is for all. And fewer 
people have attained the belongingness and self-esteem objectives of the good 
life to the fullest extent. Very few have reached the self-actualization 
stage. So the good life is concerned with all people, not only the disadvan-
taged, but also those with higher abilities, ambition, strength and energy. 
The latter group may face such roadblocks to the good life such as frequent 
overwork, coronary risks, or boring retirement. These people will need 
different programs to meet their needs for the good life. 
Implications 
To attain the good life in Iowa, there are a number of requirements for 
its fulfillment, such as: 
- Full employment for all who can work. 
Physical and mental health facilities and services available to 
all Iowans. 
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Total elimination of discrimination in education, employment and 
social organizations. 
A significant increase in human services to help those who cannot 
11 pull themselves up by their own bootstraps, 11 such as the poor and 
the elderly. 
A significant increase in jobs and upgrading of wages for existing 
jobs. (People working full time, but making less than $4,000 
today are not able to go beyond necessities.) 
The definition of the good life in terms of human needs may sound 
Utopian. But few people would disagree on the ultimate desirability. Nor 
would many disagree with the implied economic development goals: 
- Higher average income. 
- Reduced poverty. 
- Better quality environment. 
- More balance in location of new jobs. 
- More and better quality services in both public and private 
sectors. 
Most of the arguments on the good life would come on the degree to 
which society can provide for these human needs, who should obtain the bene-
fits of the good life, and how such a policy would be put into operation. 
To work in the direction of attaining the good life, a development 
policy would obviously have to provide or encourage new jobs, job training, 
rehabilitation to reduce the number of unemployable persons, strictly 
enforced housing codes, high environmental standards, day-care centers to 
encourage families to have multiple workers, and good health care, educa-
tional, recreation and cultural facilities. 
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A Provincial Approach 
One extreme method of attaining the good life is rather provincial -but 
is an alternative for Iowans. It consists essentially of setting high stan-
dards for the good 1 ife for all within the state and "exporting" or encourag-
ing out-migration of those people who can't attain, or those industries that 
don't provide, the good life. 
The state could, for instance, provide favorable zoning, industrial 
bonds, public utility connections and other location incentives only to high-
wage employers. Low-wage employers would be encouraged to relocate or 
mechanize to raise labor productivity and wages. Workers unable to perform 
or secure well-paid jobs in Iowa would be encouraged to move out of the state. 
A high minimum wage law in the state could encourage this. 
In addition, higher taxation to provide the services of the good life 
also would encourage low-income people to move elsewhere. High-standard 
housing codes and strict environmental standards would raise the cost of liv-
ing, making Iowa more unattractive to low-income people. Industry not able 
to meet the high-quality pollution standards would be sacrificed. Limits 
could be placed on industrial location in urban and congested areas to keep 
the east-central part of the state from growing out of proportion to western 
and southern Iowa. 
Economic Realities 
But whatever degree of the good life we select as a goal for Iowa, and 
whatever method we select to bring it about bring us face-to-face with some 
economic realities. 
First, our definition of the good life indicated that we need adequate 
income for people. That means more income for many. More income means we 
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need economic progress. More economic progress means more technological 
progress. For it is new technology that has made our present material com-
forts possible. Particularly if we define our food, shelter and clothing 
needs in terms of today•s standards, these are products of technology. And 
they are important elements of the good life. 
But as with most things, technological progress has costs. Technology 
makes old skills obsolete. That threatens security, stability and self-
esteem. It causes tensions and frustrations, maybe illness. Security, 
stability and self-esteem, of course, are elements of the good life. 
In the definition of the good life, we want jobs for all who could work. 
In fact, to bring the good life to all, we must even increase the number who 
are employable. But full employment also requires economic growth. If we 
are to maintain and improve our material levels of living, economic progress 
also is needed to maintain effective trade relationships with other nations. 
Economic progress also thrives on competition. And Darwinian competi-
tion- the survival of the fittest, whether it be individual, community or 
state- threatens security, self-esteem and compassion for one another. 
For economic progress, those who are successful in competition are rewarded 
economically. Others can be severely penalized economically, sometimes for 
reasons beyond their control, which is obviously a threat to the good life 
for them. 
Full employment in turn feeds the forces of inflation. Inflation is a 
threat to security, some freedoms, and for some people it threatens their 
material well-being. Inflation creates economic hardships, particularly for 
the poor and the elderly. Inflation is an erosive threat to those who retire, 
discouraging early retirement and limiting the freedom of choice. 
For instance, if the annual inflation rate is 5-1/2 percent, it will 
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require an income of $42,000 a year in the year 2000 to equal a $10,000 
yearly income today. 
In the past, economic progress has brought investment, jobs and people 
to already congested areas. Agriculture is a prime example of how economic 
progress causes people to leave sparsely populated areas, causing major 
social and economic problems in both rural and urban areas. 
Consequently, private and public services lag in the growing areas and 
become costly or nonexistent in the rural areas. Both situations detract 
from the good life; both come from economic progress. 
In adding to the congestion of urban areas, economic progress creates 
competition for space needed for parks and recreation areas in the good life. 
And as suggested in Alternative II, it may be difficult to balance develop-
ment in urban and rural areas of the state. Industries discouraged from 
locating in certain areas may move outside the state, which will not con-
tribute jobs for the good life in Iowa. 
Technological and economic progress have encouraged people to scatter 
to other areas, states and even nations where there is more economic oppor-
tunity for them. This means a tightly knit family unit can no longer be 
maintained. The security, stability, self-esteem and belongingness histori-
cally provided by the family is impossible to maintain. These too are 
important elements of the good life. 
In addition, the growing trend of more working women places additional 
stress upon family life and its benefits. 
Resources also may limit our capacity to attain the good life. Though 
once we considered our supply of resources to be unlimited, now we know this 
is a fallacy. Though new technology could provide new resources and recycl-
ing will increase our efficiency in the use of resources, consumption per 
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person will probably decrease in the future. That could mean a decline in 
the quality of life as we would define it today. 
The good life goals also suggest that there would have to be an increas-
ing amount of public services. This, plus population and congestion pres-
sures, suggest that the role of government must increase. 
One of the costs undoubtedly would be some of our individual freedoms 
as we have known them. Economic decisions will be more regulated. Some 
economic activities will be judged in relation to the long-run good of 
society, rather than the short-run increased gain to the individual. The 
concept of property rights will come under increasing pressure. Thus, some 
actions of government that are intended to benefit the total society can 
cause frustration and economic loss to individuals- another conflict in the 
struggle to attain the good life. 
Finally, as the increasing role of government suggests, our own atti-
tudes and beliefs may stand in the way of attaining the good life. Our 
strongest defenses of independence and freedom usually come in the defense 
of an individual or a special interest group, rather than the common good. 
Our attitudes toward property rights, work, who is entitled to benefits, 
growth, competition, government, and many other things would stand in the 
way of developing the good life as defined here. And many would no doubt 
view any loss of these values and beliefs as a threat to their right to the 
good life. 
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SUMMARY AND EVALUATION 
The purpose of examining future alternatives for Iowa is for each indi-
vidual to make up his or her own mind regarding the kind of Iowa he or she 
would like to see in the year 2000. That decision should be made on the 
basis of values- of what you would like to see for yourself and your neigh-
bors in the future. 
Then to develop a state policy, we must reach some agreement among all 
Iowans regarding the basic direction of that policy. And that decision is 
not unlimited. We can decide on whatever kind of Iowa we want in the future. 
But unless our decision is realistic, we have little hope of the goal ever 
being attained. 
How realistic are the goals spelled out in Alternatives I, II and III? 
Alternative I is probably most realistic. To attain it, we need do 
little but allow current policies, attitudes and activities to continue. 
The projections under Alternative I, using current social and economic 
trends along with foreseeable changes, therefore, become the ones most 
likely to occur. 
Alternative II -the higher growth rate -is realistic and possible. 
But it will take a concerted, organized effort by Iowans to attain it. 
Since Alternative II does require basic agreement on a growth policy and 
work toward growth, it is not as likely to occur, unless a national policy 
regarding pollution or industrial location is adopted that encourages 
growth in Iowa. 
The answer is not a simple one regarding Alternative III, the good 
life. It appears possible to take some steps toward improving the life of 
Iowans. But to make the good life the ultimate goal forces us to face some 
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economic realities. Any major advancements toward the good life in one area 
are likely to detract from the good life in other areas. The costs of eco-
nomic development to provide more jobs, for instance, may include congestion, 
inflation, rising taxes, or threats to security through change. 
The critical factor, then, in attaining the good life becomes one of 
balance. The important thing is to recognize the relationships, so that 
when decisions are made regarding economic development, we anticipate the 
costs to the quality of life. Or, we must recognize that attempts to bring 
us the good life may be at the expense of economic development. Recognizing 
these relationships will allow Iowans to make intelligent decisions that keep 
both economic development and the quality of life within a tolerable balance. 
With this knowledge, how do you want Iowa to develop by the year 2000? 
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Table 1 : Population Projections With Continued 
Current Social and Eeonomic Forces. 
Office of Planning and Programming Areas 
1970 
AGE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
0-4 7509 11488 11151 13044 9274 8009 21487 13151 
5-24 35495 54394 55186 60678 43957 36501 97852 52591 
25-44 17931 31819 28628 35113 25780 21704 53120 27095 
45-64 21045 34406 31547 34971 27193 21848 50304 23405 
65+ 14134 21573 19498 20797 17399 14212 27575 13976 
Total 95351 153180 146010 164603 126603 102274 250338 130218 
1980 
0-4 7510 12073 12848 15675 9672 8323 28064 14439 
5-24 29042 44253 45201,:· 50669 38776 32857 98064 54674 
25-44 18776 33536 29878 38232 27636 23780 66819 32085 
45-64 17871 29621 27175 30166 23914 19248 48690 22600 
65+ 13859 21529 19158 19982 16841 14176 29903 14210 
Total 87058 141012 134266 154724 116839 98384 . 271540 138008 
1990 
0-4 7950 12140 14000 16668 10000 9325 36498 18222 
5-24 27335 35341 37918 44802 30692 29070 101324 52421 
25-44 19877 33724 32560 40654 28572 26645 86961 40495 
45-64 14703 24819 22330 25984 20108 18014 49291 22488 
65+ 13679 21675 19559 19234 17131 14420 35862 15213 
Total 83544 127699 126367 147342 106053 97474 309936 148839 
2000 
0-4 6506 9877 11469 13919 8821 9544 35123 18994 
5-24 28137 36319 42419 50455 31862 31413 128348 62055 
25-44 16264 27436 26672 33948 25204 23985 83625 42099 
45-64 15396 26158 23305 28292 21556 19737 59224 26630 
65+ 11616 18661 16849 16591 15065 12703 33408 14690 
Total 77919 118451 120714 143205 102508 97382 339728 164418 
Table 1 continued 35 
Office of Planning and Programming Areas 
1970 
i ! State ! 
AGE 9 10 11 12 I 13 14 _ 15 16 Total ' 
0-4 22291 29899 42049 7252 14679 3959 10588 9545 
5-24 88940 130159 190456 32189 67162 19930 51253 41939 
25-44 55240 77931 116198 ' 17947 40437 11739 30125 25940 
45-64 46163 59227 97817 20551 39752 14888 36054 25577 
65+ 23983 32918 53686 13880 25912 11331 25805 15773 
' Total 236617 330134 502206 ' 91819 181942 l ,_6184) 153825 118774 2,824,376 
1980 ' 
0-4 28430 31169 51612 7102 15624 3254 10208 10755 
5-24 94264 138556 188782 32257 58595 13057 40582 37994 
• 25-44 71076 82025 143368 17754 43401 14185 29166 29068 
45-64 45061 62083 96873 16754 36511 10803 28596 22625 
•• 65+ 25327 35759 56271 13294 ' 25365 11598 24808 15575 
Total 264158 348992 . 536906 87161 179496 52897 133360 116017 2,860,818 
1990 ' 
0-4 37354 41052 63765 7210 16925 3150 10225 12259 
5-24 102335 133128 188821 20960 i 49697 9804 32026 36134 
25-44 93387 108031 177124 18026 47013 10502 29214 33132 
45-64 48611 67800 97606 13819 32345 11470 23498 21011 
65+ 27698 28498 60646 13153 25044 10073 23435 15602 
Total 309405 388508 587912 ' . 73168 171024 44999 118398 118138 2,959,?9]. 
2000 
0-4 39591 43700 63204 7225 14766 2360 8096 11106 
5-24 132752 157442 232600 20895 53380 8541 31467 40964 
25-44 98977 115000 175567 18064 41016 7866 23132 30015 
45-64 62547 71362 120429 13671 34721 10334 22750 23545 
65+ 27036 40353 60061 10722 23002 7517 18587 13801 
Total 360903 427857 I 651861 70577 166885 36618 104032 119431 3~102 2 76q 
I' 
·I 
* 
AREA Mfg. 
1 3790 
2 9901 
3 6781 
4 8953 
5 7197 
6 8405 
7 20992 
8 13555 
9 28181 
10 31643 
11 37112 
12 3302 
13 9534 
14 1984 
15 11509 
16 14977 
State Total 217,821 
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Table 2: Employment Projections With Continued 
Current Social and Economic Forces. 
1970 
Ag. Other Total Mfg. Ag. 
987i 26225 39886 4170 : 7403 
11215 36215 57331 1089l i 8411 
I 
12560 33555 52901 7465 : 9420 
8088 44927 61968 9848 ', 6066 
8012 29603 44812 7917 ' 6009 
6839 24686 39930 9246 5109 
9364 52408 82764 26645 7023 
5952 28174 47681 14911 ; 4464 
4776 58969 91926 31000 3582 
12423 89025 133091 34807 9317 
11882 159274 208268 40823 8912 
9466 20825 33593 3632 7100 
12084 50517 72135 10487 9063 
7277 14597 23858 2182 5458 
9160 35396 56065 11660 6870 
3504 28120 46601 19475 2628 
142,473 732,516 1~092,810 . 241,159 106,855 
* Offices of Planning and Programming Areas 
1980 
Other Total 
25759 37332 
' 35500 54802 
32777 49662 
45293 61207 
I 29592 73518 
26696 41071 
58457 92125 
31612 50987 
70212 104794 
98211 142335 
176333 226068 
19931 30663 
52857 72407 
14188 21828 
32586 51110 
30797 48900 
775,288 1,123,302 
Table 2 Continued 
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1990 2000 
Mfg. Ag. Other Total Mfg. Ag. Other Total 
AREA 
1 4586 5552 23655 33793 5645 4164 23680 32889 
2 11980 6308 37130 855418 12178 4731 34006 50915 
3 8211 7065 31015 46291 9032 5299 31898 46229 
4 10833 4550 48712 64095 10915 3412 45423 59750 
5 8708 4507 30835 44050 9579 3380 31727 44686 
6 10170 3847 28459 42476 11187 2885 31322 45394 
7 35159 5267 71300 111726 43061 3950 74410 121421 
8 18402 3348 36208 57958 20822 2511 39897 63230 
9 42100 2687 84321 129108 49510 2015 95461 146986 
10 42288 6988 115622 164898 46117 5241 117778 169136 
11 44906 6684 206360 257950 49396 5013 217636 272015 
12 3995 5325 18922 28242 4395 3994 18672 27061 
13 11536 6797 55000 73333 12690 5100 56335 74125 
14 2400 4093 13183 19676 2540 3070 10770 16380 
15 11900 5152 29334 46386 12000 3864 25429 41293 
16 16122 1971 33342 51435 17100 1478 32304 50882 
State Total 283,296 80,141 863,398 1,226 -~835 314,787 60,107 888,528 1,262,422 
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Table 3 
Per Capita Income 
With Current Social and Economic Forces. 
(in constant 1970 dollars) 
Area 1970 1980 1990 2000 
1 $3017 $3590 $3930 $4760 
2 3403 4114 5332 6130 
3 2965 3504 4033 4885 
4 3478 4235 5412 6064 
5 3231 3939 5077 6201 
6 3690 4573 5537 6647 
7 3555 4242 5213 6050 
8 3248 3798 4660 5269 
9 3931 4657 5732 6495 
10 3776 4423 5057 5781 
11 3990 4700 5675 6270 
12 3218 3583 4561 5265 
13 3443 4195 5110 6225 
14 3045 3773 4570 5551 
15 3179 3846 4581 5453 
16 3643 4525 5377 6240 
State Average 3586 4226 5161 5947 
Area 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
Gross State 
Product 
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Table 4 
Gross Area Product With Current Social 
And Economic Forces. 
(in millions of constant 1970 dollars) 
1970 · 
$346,671 
627,568 
519,466 
686,952 
490,852 
525,542 
1,067,953 
507,516 
1,117,893 
1,495,516 
2,052,124 
354,540 
776,461 
225,973 
586,798 
519,228 
11,899,674 
1980 
$376,558 
696,160 
565,968 
787,440 
553,026 
540,560 
1,385,093 
629,771 
1,478,852 
1,856,105 
2,790,624 
375,572 
904,508 
239,933 
623,295 
634,816 
14,438,287 
1990 
$395,581 
817,038 
612,207 
956,963 
649,860 
648,812 
1,949,551 
834,246 
2,123,126 
2,505,654 
4,011,019 
401,465 
1,063,123 
250,987 
656,501 
774,995 
18,651,130 
2000 
$446,814 
874,633 
709,522 
1,039,506 
765,095 
804,726 
2,458,848 
1,056,245 
2,805,130 
2,970,772 
4,909,215 
446,409 
1,247,167 
253,469 
678,249 
889,699 
22,355,507 
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Table 5 
Employment Projections With High Growth 
* 1970 1980 
Area Mfg. Ag. 
r·· Other 
.To.tal Mfg. Ag. Other Total 
l 
I 
1 3790 9871 26225 39886! 4359 7403 26938 38700 
i 
2 9901 11215 36215 57331: 11386 8411 37662 57459 
I 
3 6786 12560 33555 52901~ 7804 9420 34448 51672 
I 
4 8953 8088 44927 61968' 10295 6066 47824 64185 
5 7197 8012 29603 44812' 8276 6009 31248 45533 
6 8405 6839 24686 39930 9666 5129 28321 43116 
7 20992 9364 52408 82764 27977 7023 67000 102000 
8 13555 5952 28174 47681'. 15588 4464 33771 53823 
9 28181 4776 58969 91926 32408 3582 75191 111181 
10 31643 12423 89025 133091 36389 9317 104681 150387 
: 
11 37112 11882 159274 208268 42679 8912 187604 239195 
12 3302 9466 20825 33593; 3797 7100 20859 31756 
13 9534 12084 50517 7213 5\ 10964 ! 9063 55630 75657 
14 1984 7277 14597 23858 2281 5458 14814 22553 
15 11509 9160 35396 56065 12243 6870 38226 57339 
16 14977 3504 28120 46601 16249 2628 36135 55012 
Total 217,821 142,473 732,516 1,092,81,0 252,361 106,855 840,352 1,199,568 
*Office of Planning and Programming Areas : 
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" '· Table 5 Continued 
1990 2000 
·--· I ·-·· ~ - ··- -~-- ! l Other .! l l Area Mfg. Ag. 
"I Total Mfg. I Ag. I Other Total I ···- · -····-~ -. - ··-- ··- -I ' 
1 5012 5552 l 25353 : 35917 ' 5764 4164 26238 36166 t 
2 13094 6380 ( 40567 ! 59969 15058 4731 : 41377 61166 i 
3 8974 7065 I 33536 ' 49575 10320 5299 : 35772 51391 
4 11840 4550 53267 ~ 69657 . 13616 3412 ' 55341 70369 
5 9518 4507 i 33660 47685 10945 3380 : 37858 52183 
6 11116 3847 31286 46249 12783 2885 35884 51552 
7 36915 5267 80748 122930 45214 3950 94113 143277 
8 19322 3348 43397 66067 21863 2511 50964 75338 
9 44205 2687 89764 136656 51985 2015 100800 162000 
10 44402 6988 123336 174726 48125 5241 128078 181444 
11 49080 6684 228632 284396 56443 5013 251969 313425 
12 4367 5325 20265 29957 5021 3994 . 20646 29661 
13 12608 6797 59767 79172 14500 5100 60368 79968 
14 2624 4093 14044 20761 3017 3070 13315 19402 
15 12495 5152 36898 54545 12600 3864 36015 52479 
16 16930 1971 39519 58420 17955 1478 40632 60065 
) 
Total .302,502 80,141 954,039 1,336,682 b45 ,209 
I 
60,107 1,036,510 1,441,886 
I· 
i 
! 
t 
l 
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v Table 6 
,, 
~~ Population Required With High-Growth 
(By- Office of Planning and Programming Areas) 
1970 
AGE 1 2 3 -4 I 5 6 l 7 8 
I . . I . I 
0-4 7509 11488 11151 13044 \ 9274 8009 21487 13151 
5-24 35495 54394 55186 60678 : 43957 . 36051 97852 52591 
25-44 17931 31819 28628 35113 ) 25780 21704 53120 27095 
45-64 21045 34406 31547 34971 : 27193 21848 50304 23405 
65+ 14134 21573 19498 ·; 20797 : 17399 I 14212 27575 13976 
' 
Total 95351 153180 146010 164603 ' 126603 102274 250338 130218 
1980 
0-4 7647 12430 13137 16139 . 9972 8575 33397 14961 
5-24 29573 45563 46224 52170 39978 33854 106217 56653 
25-44 19119 34529 30550 39365 28493 1 24502 72374 33246 
45-64 18198 30498 27786 31060 24655 19832 52738 23418 
' 65+ 14112 22166 19589 20574 17363 14606 29389 14724 
Total 88649 145186 137286 159308 ' 120461 101369 294115 143002 
1990 
0-4 8294 13000 14712 17759 10673 10472 39423 20333 
5-24 28518 37840 39846 47736 32759 31086 109445 58494 
25-44 20737 36109 34216 43317 . 30496 28493 93931 45186 
I 
45-64 15339 26574 23466 27686 ; 21462 19263 53242 25093 
65+ 14271 23208 20553 20493 18285 14920 38736 16975 
Total 87159 136731 132793 156991 113675 104234 334 777 166081 
2000 
0-4 7015 11628 12531 16419 10120 10648 40339 22454 
5-24 30340 42760 46348 59518 36555 35047 147412 73359 
2~-44 17537 32302 29142 40045 28917 30426 96046 49768 
45-64 16602 30797 25464 33374 24731 22020 68020 31481 
65+ 12526 21970 18409 19571 17284 14172 38370 17366 
Total 84020 139457 131894 168927 117607 112313 390187 194428 
43 
Table 6 Continued 
\970 
! ! I State I l AGE 9 10 11 1 12 13 14 15 +· - 16 Total 1 I 
0-4 22291 29899 42049 ! 7252 14679 : 2959 10588 l 9545 
I I \ 5-24 88940 130159 190456 1 32189 67162 19930 51253 ; 41939 
I 
25-44 55240 77931 116198 j 17947 40437 11739 30125 25940 
45-64 46163 59227 97817 ! 20551 39752 14888 36054 25577 
65+ 23983 32918 53686 13880 25912 11331 25805 15773 
i 
Total 236617 330134 502206 ! 91819 187942 61847 153825 : 118774 
2,824,376 
1980 
0-4 29640 32353 53545 7227 16021 3301 13323 12904 
5-24 98277 143822 195854 32827 60083 13247 45017 42054 
25-44 74102 85143 148739 18068 44503 14392 32353 32174 
45-64 46979 64443 100501 17050 37438 10960 31721 25043 
65+ 26405 36495 58379 13529 26009 11767 25519 16239 
Total 275403 362256 557018 88701 184054 53667 147933 128414 2,986,822 
1990 
0-4 38511 43096 69037 7517 18159 3313 13841 13822 
5-24 105506 139758 204433 21853 53322 10313 37088 40740 
25-44 96281 113411 191769 18794 50442 11047 33832 37355 
45-64 50117 71177 105676 14408 34704 12065 27213 23689 
65+ 28556 40415 65660 13713 26870 10596 25139 17591 
Total 318971 407857 636575 76285 183497 47334 137113 133197 3,173,270 
2000 
' 
0-4 42495 45997 71447 7773 15623 2724 13009 12735 
5-24 142489 165718 262937 22479 i 56479 9860 38905 46972 
25-44 106237 121044 198466 19433 43400 . 9080 28600 34417 
45-64 67134 54113 136136 14707 36737 11929 28128 26998 
65+ 29019 42474 67895 11534 24337 8677 19981 15825 
Total 387374 450346 . 7368Sl 75926 176576 42270 128623 136947 3,473 .. 776 
,, 44 f Table 7 
• I 
Per Capita Income High Growth 
(in constant 1970 dollars) 
Area 1970 1980 1990 2000 
1 $3017 $3654 $4000 $4850 
2 3403 4189 5388 6253 
3 3965 3575 4129 4983 
4 3478 4319 5520 6186 
5 3231 4003 5157 6330 
6 3690 4665 5647 6700 
7 .3555 4327 5318 6200 
8 3248 3874 4752 5375 
9 3931 4747 5848 6625 
10 3776 4511 5402 5900 
11 3990 4795 5790 6400 
12 3218 3654 4652 5370 
13 3443 4279 5212 6350 
14 3045 3850 4662 5665 
15 3179 3923 4673 5562 
16 3643 4615 5485 6365 
State Average 3'586 4372 5291 6052 
,. 
Area 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
GSP 
45 
Table 8 
High Growth 
Gross Area Product 
(in millions of 1970 dollars) 
1970 1980 1990 
$346,671 $390,521 $420,616 
627,568 733,146 888,053 
519,466 591,477 658,535 
686,952 829,407 1,044,613 
490,852 581,186 706,594 
525,542 569,987 709,562 
1,067,953 1~534,176 2,145,919 
507,516 667,740 951,353 
1 '117, 893 1,576,770 2,248,158 
1,495,516 1,969,780 2,656,055 
2,052,124 3,219,181 4,441,786 
354,540 390,686 427,731 
776,461 949,287 1,152,848 
225,973 249,000 265,998 
586,798 699,542 772,277 
519,228 714,456 880,601 
11,899,674 15,666,342 20,370,699 
2000 
$491,532 
1,051,154 
792,243 
1,259,550 
897,401 
917,944 
2,902,613 
1,259,014 
3, 092,908 
3,201,046 
5,680,939 
491,470 
1,351,421 
288,510 
862,327 
1,050,702 
25,590,779 
llllllllllll~~~~illl~ilil~~~~[lll~~l~l~lllllll 
3 1723 02080 6477 
